

Propaganda Analysis

FOIAb3b1 During 1954, the systematic propaganda analysis operation in OO/ was able to correct misapprehensions of the government's political analysis and policy makers in three cases of major significance:

a. Prior to the Communist bombardment of Quemoy during the Manila SEATO Conference, when propaganda on the "liberation" of Formosa was being widely interpreted as bluster or as domestic morale-building, it was able to show that the Chinese Communists were making a serious commitment to their own people of an intensity such as to raise the expectation of military action at an early date.

b. As early as November 1954 it was able to point out serious differences between a Malenkov faction and a Khrushchev faction on matters relating to the Soviet national defense policy. These differences were partially recognized by the Moscow embassy only in December, and confirmed at the February 1955 plenum of the Party Central Committee.

c. It was able to correct promptly in October 1954 the erroneous impression among political analysts that Soviet and Cominform propaganda against Yugoslavia was still being carried on, if on a reduced scale, and to show that Soviet sources were beginning to use materials favorable to Yugoslavia.

Document No. 51
EX-100-100-100
11-100-100
Classified by: 3 6
Exempt from GDS
Auth: H-170-3
Date: 27 JUN 1979
By: 371691

This document is part of classified information. It is not to be released without the approval of the file. Document is classified.